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N. X. V CABRINI MEDICAL CENTER1
(decided February 14, 2002)
I. SYNOPSIS
The New York Court of Appeals unanimously upheld summary
judgment against a vicarious liability cause of action. The court
held the defendant was not vicariously liable for a doctor's sexual
assault because the act was not in furtherance of the defendant's
business and it was not within the scope of the doctor's employ-
ment.2 The court also reversed summary judgment holding that
the defendant may be negligent because a hospital staff member
has a duty to protect a patient from a third person if she knew or
should have known that there was a reasonably foreseeable risk of




N.X. underwent surgery for genital warts at Cabrini Medical
Center and was placed in a recovery room while still under anesthe-
sia.4 The nurses, who had been taking care of N.X., were monitor-
ing another patient in an adjacent bed when Dr. Andrea Favara
entered the room wearing hospital scrubs and identification.5 Dr.
Favara proceeded directly to N.X.'s bed; however, he was not one of
the physicians listed on her chart.
6
N.X. woke to find Dr. Favara pushing up her hospital gown
and ordering her to open her legs.7 She claimed that Dr. Favara
then placed his fingers inside her vagina and anus.8 N.X. repeat-
edly asked him to stop, but Dr. Favara did not remove his fingers
1. 97 N.Y.2d 247 (2002).
2. Id. at 251.
3. Id. at 255.
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until her third plea. He then attempted to quickly leave the room,
but was intercepted by the nurses.9
Despite their close proximity to N.X., the nurses did not admit
to seeing or hearing the interaction between the doctor and the
plaintiff.10 When N.X. complained to the nurses about the assault
the head nurse questioned the doctor about it.11 Upon question-
ing, the doctor admitted to examining the plaintiff without having
a female witness present, as was required by hospital rules. 12 Dr.
Favara was immediately suspended from treating patients and was
terminated after an investigation.
13
B. Procedural History
N.X. sued Dr. Favara and Cabrini Medical Center (Cabrini) in
the Supreme Court of New York County claiming that Cabrini was
both negligent in failing to protect her, and vicariously liable for
Dr. Favara's conduct.
14
Cabrini filed a motion for summary judgement on two
grounds. First, the hospital asserted that the negligence cause of
action failed for lack of evidence and second, vicarious liability
could not be established because Dr. Favara's conduct was not
within the scope of his employment.'
5
In opposing Cabrini's summary judgment motion, the plaintiff
argued that there were several unsettled factual issues. A trial was
necessary to determine whether Cabrini fulfilled its duty to protect
the patient and whether Dr. Favara was acting within the scope of
his employment.16 In support of her position, the plaintiff submit-
ted an affidavit from Dr. G.P. Carrera stating that Cabrini had a
"heightened responsibility" to protect the plaintiff since she was
under anesthesia. 17 This higher duty required the nurses in the




13. N.X., 97 N.Y2d at 250.




17. N.X., 719 N.Y.S.2d at 60.
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room to notice Dr. Favara, question his intentions, and observe his
interaction with the plaintiff.
18
The Supreme Court of New York County determined that sum-
mary judgment was inappropriate on both the negligence and vica-
rious liability claims. 19 The court held that there was an issue of
fact as to whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a higher respon-
sibility due to her sedated state. 20 The court also held that there
was a question of fact as to whether Dr. Favara's actions were within
the scope of his employment.2 1 Additionally, the court dismissed
the plaintiff's claim that Cabrini was negligent in hiring Dr. Favara
because he was hired following a complete screening by the hospi-
tal's hiring committee. 22
Defendant appealed the supreme court's decision to the New
York Appellate Division, First Department, which granted summary
judgment to the defendant on both causes of action. 23
The appellate division held that Cabrini was not vicariously lia-
ble for Dr. Favara's actions. 24 In order to hold an employer vicari-
ously liable, the plaintiff must show that the employee committed
the act in furtherance of the employer's business and that the act
was within the scope of his employment. 25 When a hospital em-
ployee sexually assaults a patient, his conduct is neither deemed to
further the employer's business, nor is it within the scope of his
employment. Therefore, a sexual assault by a hospital employee
cannot be the basis for vicarious liability.
2 6
In support of its decision, the appellate division cited Judith M.
v. Sisters of Charity House, 93 N.Y.2d 932 (1997), in which the court
held that a hospital was not vicariously liable to a patient who was
sexually assaulted by an orderly assigned to bathe her.2 7 The court
in Judith M. determined that the orderly was not acting in further-
ance of the employer's business, and was not within the scope of his
18. NX., 719 N.Y.S.2d at 60.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 62-3.
22. Id. at 63.
23. N.X., 719 N.Y.S.2d at 60.
24. N.X., 719 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 63-64.
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employment because his actions were purely for personal gratifica-
tion.28 The appellate division found that in the present case, Dr.
Favara did not act in furtherance of Cabrini's business when he sex-
ually assaulted the plaintiff.29 In fact, the Court found that there
was a "more compelling basis" to dismiss the vicarious liability claim
against Cabrini because, unlike Judith M., where the orderly who
committed the sexual assault was assigned to bathe the patient; Dr.
Favara was not assigned to the plaintiff, but assaulted her on his
own.
30
The appellate division also held that Cabrini was not negligent
for failing to prevent Dr. Favara's assault. 31 The court determined
that the hospital did not have a "heightened responsibility", as the
supreme court posited, but rather had a duty to use reasonable care
and diligence to protect a patient from third persons as long as the
harm was reasonably foreseeable.3 2 The appellate division did not
consider Dr. Favara's assault to be reasonably foreseeable, because
the possibility that a doctor with no history of sexual misconduct
would sexually assault a patient was too remote to be considered
legally foreseeable; nor was the assault within "a class of foreseeable
hazards." 33 The court also found that the plaintiff did not prove
that Cabrini was negligent in failing to supervise Dr. Favara. 34 Spe-
cifically, the plaintiff did not show that Cabrini knew, or should
have known about the employee's tendency to commit an assault.
3 5
Justice Saxe, in a dissenting opinion, argued that Cabrini
should have been denied summary judgment because both issues
raised factual questions.36 With regard to the issue of vicarious lia-
bility, the dissent argued that even though Dr. Favara was not as-
signed to take care of plaintiff, the question of whether he was
actually unauthorized to perform a pelvic exam was not ad-
dressed.37 If the doctor was unauthorized to perform a pelvic exam




32. Id. at 65.
33. Id.
34. N.X., 719 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
35. Id. at 65-66.
36. Id. at 69.
37. Id. at 75.
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then he was acting outside the scope of his employment. However,
if he were authorized to perform a pelvic exam then he was within
the scope of his employment, and Cabrini could be vicariously lia-
ble.3 8 He argued that this determination was necessary before
granting a motion for summary judgment.
With regard to the issue of Cabrini's negligence in protecting
the plaintiff, the dissent argued that, "the question of whether an
injury is foreseeable is ordinarily for the jury to decide." 39 Specifi-
cally, the jury had to consider what the nurses knew or should have
known at the time.
40
The plaintiff appealed the appellate court's decision to the
New York Court of Appeals.41 The New York Court of Appeals con-
sidered whether summary judgment should be upheld for both the
vicarious liability and negligence claims. 42 Specifically, the court
had to determine whether Cabrini was vicariously liable to the
plaintiff for Dr. Favara's assault and whether Cabrini was negligent




The court of appeals first considered plaintiffs claim that
Cabrini was vicariously liable for Dr. Favara's actions. Under the
doctrine of respondeat superior "an employer is vicariously liable for
the tortious acts of its employees only if those acts were committed
in furtherance of the employer's business and within the scope of
the employment."44 The general rule is that a sexual assault per-
formed by a hospital employee is not in furtherance of the hospi-
tal's business, nor is it within the scope of the doctor's employment,
because it is committed solely for personal motives. 45 The court of
appeals relied on the appellate division's analysis of the present
38. N.X., 719 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 71.
41. NX. v. Cabrini Medical Center, 97 N.Y.2d 247 (2002).
42. Id. at 251.
43. Id.
44. N.X., 97 N.Y.2d at 251.
45. Id.
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case in light of Judith M. v. Sisters of Charity Hospital and held that
Cabrini was not vicariously liable.
46
B. Negligence
The court next considered plaintiffs claim that Cabrini was lia-
ble for negligence because its nurses did not protect her from the
assault.47 The court found that a hospital has a duty to safeguard
the welfare of its patients from harm by third persons as long as the
harm was reasonably foreseeable.
48
The court established that Dr. Favara's conduct was reasonably
foreseeable as a matter of law. It disagreed with defendant's argu-
ment that because Dr. Favara had no known history of sexual as-
sault and the misconduct was readily observable by the nurses in the
room, his conduct was not reasonably foreseeable. 49 The court
noted that Dr. Favara's presence in the plaintiffs room should have
alerted the nurses that the plaintiff could potentially be in danger
of imminent harm for a number of reasons. 50 Nurse Reyes admit-
ted that residents are not allowed in the recovery room, that she
knew the identity of all of the plaintiffs doctors, and that she saw
Dr. Favara enter the room and go to the plaintiff.
5 1
The court also questioned the nurses' credibility because they
claimed to be unaware of Dr. Favara's actions despite their close
proximity to the plaintiff.52 The court noted that the entire room
only contained four beds, one of which was occupied by the plain-
tiff and another where the nurses stood.53 One of the nurses was
only three feet away from plaintiffs bed, therefore "easily within
earshot."54 Another nurse had initially admitted to hearing the
conversation between Dr. Favara and plaintiff, but later claimed
that she had not.
55
46. N.X., 97 N.Y.2d at 252.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 253.
49. N.X., 97 N.Y.2d at 252.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 252-253.
52. Id. at 254.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. N.X., 97 N.Y.2d at 252.
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These factors led the court to determine that it was likely for a
jury to find that the nurses disregarded readily observable factors
that would have alerted them to Dr. Favara's actions.56 The court
specified that its holding did not require nurses to interrogate phy-
sicians or to monitor interaction between the patient and physi-
cian.57 It did, however, require a common sense approach
triggering in hospital staffs a duty to protect the patient when "ob-
servations and information known to or readily perceivable" indi-
cate a risk of harm to a patient under the circumstances. '5 8
IV. CONCLUSION
In N.X. v. Cabrini Medical Center the New York Court of Appeals
held that the hospital was not vicariously liable for Dr. Favara's ac-
tions because his sexual assault was neither in furtherance of
Cabrini's business, nor was it within the scope of his duties. 59 The
court also held that whether the hospital was negligent in protect-
ing the plaintiff raises questions of fact, and thereby denied
Cabrini's motion for summary judgement on this issue.60 The
court remanded the negligence claim to the supreme court for fur-
ther proceedings. 61
Smit Kapadia
56. N.X., 97 N.Y.2d at 252.
57. Id. at 255.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. 252.
61. Id.
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